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From international law to national law: The opportunities and limits of contractual CSR 
supply chain governance 
Kasey McCall-Smith and Andreas Rühmkorf1 
 
I. Introduction 
Transnational Corporations (TNCs) with global supply chains regularly incorporate a supplier 
code of conduct into their relations with their suppliers.2 These codes stipulate Corporate 
Social Responsibility (CSR) obligations. Whilst there are different methods of incorporating 
supplier codes of conduct into the supply chain, a common method is through contracts, 
which is the focus of this chapter. Hard and soft international law instruments such as 
International Labour Organization (ILO) conventions and the UN Global Compact often 
feature in documents such as the supplier codes of conduct. 
This chapter explores the potential gap-bridging role of contract law as a means of giving 
force to international CSR standards, through the imposition of CSR obligations on 
companies in other countries through supply chain contracts. Therefore the discussion 
considers the ways in which CSR standards can become an enforceable part of a contract. It 
will assess the opportunities and limitations that the use of and reference to international law 
instruments in supply contracts provides for the promotion of CSR in global supply chains. 
The chapter focuses on English law, the frequent law of choice in international sales 
contracts, even where neither of the contracting parties is UK-based.3 
The chapter is divided into three parts. The first is the data analysis of the practice of using 
contract law as an instrument for imposing international standards on suppliers. Supplier 
codes of conduct and, where available, terms and conditions of purchase of 30 FTSE100 
companies are examined. This analysis reveals the international law standards most 
commonly referenced by TNCs vis-à-vis their suppliers. We examine how these standards are 
used in supplier contracts, i.e. are the international standards simply mentioned in the supplier 
code of conduct by general or specific reference or are they expressly incorporated into 
supply chain contracts. 
                                                          
1 Dr Kasey McCall-Smith is a Lecturer in Public International Law at the University of Edinburgh. Dr Andreas 
Rühmkorf is a Lecturer in Commercial Law at the University of Sheffield.  
2 Details of data analysis on file with the authors. S Skadegaard Thorsen, S Jeppensen, ‘Changing Course – A 
Study into Responsible Supply Chain Management’ (Global CSR and Copenhagen Business School for the 
Danish Ministry 2011) 9. 
3 See E McKendrick, Contract Law (8th edn, Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 10. 
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The second part then critically assesses the business practice of incorporating international 
standards into supply contracts from both a public international law and a contract law 
perspective. It explores the opportunities and the limitations that this linkage provides for the 
promotion of CSR in global supply chains. Issues that this practice raises from an 
international law perspective are, inter alia, the barriers to applicability in international law as 
well as the respective use of hard and soft law instruments. From a contract law perspective, 
the linkage of international and national law concerns issues such as drafting, incorporation, 
enforcement and the privity of contract doctrine. 
Thirdly, the chapter assesses the implications of this international law – national contract law 
interaction in the context of CSR in global supply chains. This assessment includes the 
hybridised regulatory system that is created and the important role of legislation on CSR in 
global supply chains in the home-States of TNCs (such as transparency laws) as well as 
adequate enforcement mechanisms. 
In terms of its terminology, the chapter refers to both the supply chain management of TNCs 
and to supply chain contracts. Supply chain management is the planning and management of 
all activities involved in sourcing and procurement, and all logistics management activities. It 
also includes coordination and collaboration with partners, particularly suppliers.4 The 
literature on supply chain management thus usually focuses on issues such as purchasing, cost 
and quality of the goods.5 The inclusion of CSR policies in supply chain management by 
companies is referred to as responsible supply chain management.6 To that end, companies 
usually develop a supplier code of conduct, which they incorporate into their relationships 
with their suppliers in different ways and to varying legal effects.7 One way of including the 
supplier code of conduct in the relationship with the supplier company is through contracts 
since contract law provides the framework for the purchasing of goods.8 
This chapter contributes to the existing literature that analyses the use of CSR in supply chain 
contracts by focusing on the use of international law standards, which is an issue that has, so 
far, only played a minor role in the academic literature. There is significant literature on the 
                                                          
4 See for an introduction into supply chain management S Chopra and P Meindl, Supply Chain Management: 
Strategy, Planning, and Operation (5th edn, Pearson 2013). 
5 R M Monczka et al, Purchasing & Supply Chain Management (South-Western 2010). 
6 See M van Opijnen, J Oldenziel, ‘Responsible Supply Chain Management: Potential Success Factors and 
Challenges for Addressing Prevailing Human Rights and other CSR Issues in Supply Chains of EU-based 
Companies’ (CREM and SOMO for the European Commission 2011). 
7 A Millington, ‘Responsibility in the Supply Chain‘ in A Crane, A McWilliams, D Matten et al. (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (OUP 2008) 365. 
8 ibid, 358. 
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incorporation of CSR in supply chain contracts which primarily consists of doctrinal, socio-
legal and empirical studies of the use of CSR in such buyer-supplier contracts.9 
II. The use of international law standards in global supply chains  
In this section, the findings of data analysis of how listed, UK-based TNCs incorporate 
international law standards on CSR into their supply chain management are presented. The 
analysis covers Supplier Codes of Conduct and, where available, Terms and Conditions of 
Purchase of 30 FTSE100 companies. 
The methodology employed involved the selection of 30 FTSE100 companies with an 
international supplier base and international operations. We examined TNCs’ Supplier Codes 
of Conduct, Standard Terms of Conditions of Purchase or any other additional information on 
the TNCs’ use of international CSR standards.  Given their size and public standing, 
FTSE100 companies were selected due to the amount of publicly available information on 
their websites. Table 1 shows a preponderance of the secondary and tertiary economic sectors 
among the companies selected due to the decreasing size of the primary economic sector in 
developed countries. 
The documentary sources analysed by the authors ‘provide a rich source of data’10 though the 
analysis inevitably is influenced by the nature of the documents. As such, the key inquiry was 
the content and wording of the documents in terms of international CSR standards. For 
example, we were interested to understand how contract law may or may not give legal force 
to international CSR standards; therefore, stringency was a criterion against which the 
wording of the documents was examined.  
This approach has limitations and advantages. A limitation is that the companies were 
selected expressly due to their international operations, not randomly chosen. Also, whilst all 
companies published their supplier codes of conduct online, few publicised their Standard 
Terms and Conditions of Purchase. We focused on documents in the public domain as 
                                                          
9 See for example, K Peterkova Mitkidis, Sustainability Clauses in International Business Contracts (Eleven 
International Publishing 2015); L Vytopil, Contractual Control in the Supply Chain: On Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Codes of Conduct, Contracts and (Avoiding) Liability (Eleven International Publishing 2015); A 
Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility Codes: On Global Self-Regulation and National Private 
Law (Hart 2015); F Cafaggi, ‘Regulation through Contracts: Supply-Chain Contracting and Sustainability 
Standards’ (2016) 12 ERCL 1; D McBarnet and M Kurkchiyan, ‘Corporate Social Responsibility through  
Contractual Control? Global supply chains and ‘other regulation’ in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu, T Campbell 
(eds) The New Corporate Accountability: Corporate Social Responsibility and the Law (CUP 2007) 59. 
10 L Webley, ‘Qualitative Approaches to Empirical Legal Research’, in P. Cane & H. Kritzer (eds), The Oxford 
Handbook of Empirical Legal Research (OUP 2010) 938. 
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transparency is a cornerstone of effective CSR.11 It is therefore possible that companies use 
international CSR standards in ways that are not visible from an outside perspective.  
The advantage of documentary analysis is that it allowed us assess a larger set of companies 
than would have been possible through an in-depth study of few companies. This provided 
greater insight on the actual use of international CSR standards by leading UK-listed 
companies. Thus examining these documents enabled detection of similarities and differences 
from a larger sample and greater insight not only how often international standards are used, 
but also how they are used, such as through direct incorporation into a supplier code of 
conduct. Effectively, documents were examined to determine how they used international 
CSR standards, such as whether the supplier code is based on a particular international 
standard, the results of which are shown in table 2. Furthermore, doctrinal legal assessment of 
the documents underpins the following analysis about the wording and enforceability of these 
documents.  
 Table 1 below shows the economic sector and business areas of the companies examined 
representing a cross-industry study, including: pharmaceuticals, retail, fashion, mining, oil 
and gas, and telecommunication. The focus is the information they publish about CSR in their 
supply chain, particularly their supplier code of conduct, and what these documents say about 
international CSR standards. Both CSR and/or sustainability sections of each website were 
examined as it appears that in business practice these terms are increasingly used 
interchangeably.12 CSR/Sustainability reports were not examined as our analysis focussed on 
the ways TNCs use international CSR standards vis-à-vis their suppliers and these reports 
contain little information that adds to the aim of the analysis. 
Our understanding of CSR is based on two definitions: First, the definition adopted by the 
European Commission in its 2011 Communication on CSR in which it defines CSR as ‘the 
responsibility of enterprises for their impacts on society’.13 Whilst this definition shows that 
                                                          
11 UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human 
Rights: An Interpretive Guide, UN Doc HR/PUB/12/02 (2012) 25. 
12 The Institute for Human Rights and Business (IHRB) uses the terms interchangeably, see S Skadegaard 
Thorsen, ‘Are Current Approaches to Responsible Supply Chain Management Working?’ (IHRB, 12 August 
2010) <https://www.ihrb.org/focus-areas/commodities/commentary-current-approaches-responsible-supply-
chain-management-working> accessed 25 May 2018; R Strand, RE Freeman and K Hockerts, ‘Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Sustainability in Scandinavia: An Overview’ (2015) 127 Journal of Business Ethics 1, 2. 
13 European Commission, ‘Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: A renewed EU strategy 2011-14 
for Corporate Social Responsibility’ COM (2011) 681 final, para 3.1. 
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CSR can be both mandatory and voluntary, it does not say much about its content. We, 
therefore, also adopt the following definition from Campbell and Vick:  
At a minimum the term implies an obligation on the part of large companies to pursue 
objectives advancing the interests of all groups affected by their activities – not just 
shareholders but also employees, consumers, suppliers, creditors and local 
communities. These interests are not just economic, but also include environmental, 
human rights and ‘quality of life’ concerns. The obligation to be socially responsible is 
usually conceived of as being over and above the minimum requirement imposed on 
companies by formal legal rules, although this is not invariably the case.14 
Table 1: Sectors and business areas of the 30 companies 
Primary Secondary Tertiary 
Mining 
 
Anglo American, 
BHP Billiton, 
Randgold, Rio 
Tinto 
Retail and consumer goods 
 
Diaego, Marks & Spencer, Next, 
Reckitt Benckiser, Unilever, Tesco, 
Burberry, British American Tobacco, 
Imperial Brands, Sainsbury’s 
  
Hotels 
 
Intercontinental Hotels 
  
 
Defence, automobiles, automotive / 
aerospace components 
GKN, BAE Systems, Rolls Royce 
Outsourcing and 
communications 
Bunzl, British Telecom 
Group, 
Vodafone 
  Pharmaceuticals & medical equipment 
Astra Zeneca, GlaxoSmithKline, Hikma 
Pharmaceuticals, Smith & Nephew 
Inspection and product 
testing 
Intertek 
  Chemicals 
  
Johnson Matthey 
  
  Energy industry and petroleum 
  
Centrica, Royal Dutch Shell, BP 
  
 
                                                          
14 K Campbell, D Vick, ‘Disclosure Law and the Market for Corporate Social Responsibility’ in McBarnet, et al. 
The New Corporate Accountability, 242. 
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Table 2 presents the frequency that different international CSR standards are used in the 
supply chain documents of the 30 companies assessed. Where the documents such as the 
supplier code of conduct refer to more than one international standard, each standard 
mentioned was counted. The issue of referencing more than one standard (combination of 
different standards) is addressed below. 
Table 2: Frequency of incorporation / reference to international CSR standards  
 
          
International CSR standard  Frequency        of use 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights 19x 
Intenational Labour Organisation conventions/labour 
standards  
19x 
UN Global Compact 17x 
Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code 6x 
The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 5x 
OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises 4x 
 
This analysis revealed the following findings. First, the supply chain documents analysed  
demonstrate a widespread reference to international CSR standards. Twenty-nine of the 30 
companies analysed refer to or incorporate different international CSR standards into their 
supplier codes of conduct.15 Second, table 2 conveys that the most widely referenced 
international documents are the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR), the conventions and labour standards set out by the International Labour 
Organisation (ILO) and the UN Global Compact. Third, we find that many TNCs state that 
the provisions in their supplier code of conduct are based on international CSR standards 
which are, in turn, labelled as ‘reference points’. 16 By this the companies suggest that their 
supplier codes are based on one or more of the international standards in table 2. For example, 
this can mean that there are provisions, such as on forced and child labour, which are based on 
the principles found in the international standards to which the code makes reference. Fourth, 
the documents assessed address a range of CSR issues, from labour standards (e.g. working 
hours, prohibition of child and forced labour) to environmental issues and bribery. The 
frequent reference to variable international CSR standards indicates an interaction between 
                                                          
15 The only company that does not refer to any international standard is BAE Systems. See for example BAE’s 
Supplier Code of Conduct ‘Supplier Principles: Guidance for Responsible Business 2016’. 
16 See for example Vodafone Code of Ethical Purchasing, Version 2.0, References. 
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public international law and national contract law in global supply chains. The remainder of 
this chapter assesses this interaction.  
 
III. International law perspectives 
Global supply chains raise many issues in international law due to their transnational nature 
and the human capital that is part and parcel of all supply chains. Not only is the role of 
individuals in the supply chain a primary consideration, but the positive and negative 
influences of suppliers on the local population and environment in which they operate are also 
a concern. Thus, from an international legal perspective, there is a clear opportunity to 
contribute to the social and economic development of the local community through 
entrenchment of human rights, the rule of law, poverty alleviation and sustainable 
development, reflecting the broad range of international agreements covering these topics.17 
However, due to poor implementation and enforcement  of State’s international obligations or 
the absence of national law, international standards for the protection of individual’s rights 
and the environment are often ignored by supply chain contributors in order to maximise the 
economic value of their input. This pits economic value against societal values and is the 
tension that responsible supply chain management must navigate. As the last three decades of 
business and human rights discourse have revealed, while the international community 
continues to establish legal standards of human rights protection, the only actors from which it 
may demand compliance are States.  
In the increasingly globalised world, international law is, however, slowly adapting to 
evolving actors on the international legal plane. While sovereignty and the supremacy of the 
State remains a guiding principle, international law and practice has engendered a gradual 
increase in legal personality for individuals, international organisations and TNCs.18  These 
three categories of international actors relate uniquely to the consideration of global supply 
chains and their management. This section considers how international law struggles to ensure 
responsibly managed supply chains and the role of variable forms of international law relied 
                                                          
17 See for example ILO Resolution Concerning Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, Conclusions (105th 
Session, Geneva 8 July 2016) paras 1-2; Traidcraft/CORE, ‘Above the Law? Time to Hold Irresponsible 
Companies to Account’ November 2015 <http://www.traidcraft.co.uk/media.ashx/above-the-law-nov-15-
final.pdf> accessed 23 May 2018.  
18 The present authors have elaborated this elsewhere, K McCall-Smith, A Rühmkorf, ‘Reconciling Human 
Rights and Supply Chain Management through Corporate Social Responsibility’ in V Ruiz Abou-Nigm, K 
McCall-Smith, D French (eds), Linkages and Boundaries in Private and Public International Law (Hart 2018) 
147 – 173. 
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upon in the context of protecting against supply chain mismanagement. It begins with a brief 
overview of international legal actors and how international law endows each with limited 
rights and duties. It then proceeds to examine a number of international laws designed to 
improve the relationship between corporate activity and individual human rights holders 
through global supply chain management. Finally, the relationship between international law 
and contract law in protecting against irresponsible supply chain management will be 
introduced.  
1.  Addressing Actors in Global Supply Chains 
The inability of public international law to regulate global supply chains stems from its very 
nature as a body of law designed to govern relations between States. Admittedly, this 
definition is no longer strictly applicable,19 yet the adjudicatory mechanisms of international 
law remain, strictly speaking, open to States or, in the realm of human rights, open to 
individuals in claims against States. Accessing justice against a transnational corporation 
directly at the international level is not currently an option and therefore other legal 
approaches, including actions in tort and contract law at the national level, are inevitably 
necessary to construct an accountability framework. International human rights courts, such as 
the European Court of Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human Rights have 
permitted a minor circumnavigation of this situation in limited circumstances where a State 
facilitated or was complicit in permitting a corporation to act in a way that impeded the rights 
of individuals. These cases have generally been framed as environmental harms resulting in a 
breach of human rights similar to private law tort claims or nuisance claims for conduct 
occurring within – or, in the case of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, across – 
States’ borders.20  
This line of opinion is limited and does not expressly respond to the core problems of supply 
chain management, which typically involves breaches of human rights, environmental laws, 
anti-corruption laws and/or labour protections in a foreign State where the supplier is located. 
When the harm takes place in a foreign State, a further impediment arises in that the principle 
of non-extraterritoriality prevents application of home-State laws outside its jurisdiction 
against nationals of the foreign host-State. In extremely limited situations, this impediment 
                                                          
19 R Higgins, Problems & Process: International Law and How to Use It (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 12. 
20 For example, Taşkin v. Turkey (2006) 42 EHRR 50; Öneryildiz v. Turkey (2004) 41 EHRR 20; Lopez Ostra v. 
Spain (1994) 20 EHRR 277; Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR), Advisory Opinion OC-23/17 on 
Environment and Human Rights, 7 February 2018. 
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may be overcome, such as provided by the Alien Tort Statute in the US, which permits tort 
claims by foreign victims against foreign perpetrators committing violations of the law of 
nations on foreign soil – the ‘foreign-cubed’ claim.21 While viewed as a law of great potential 
by human rights lawyers, most general international lawyers view foreign-cubed claims as a 
challenge to the principle of extraterritoriality or question the ability of individuals to raise 
breaches of international agreements in a national court.22    
Still, it has been acknowledged that allowing a State to commit human rights violations on the 
territory of another State would be ‘unconscionable’ therefore it seems logical to assume that 
permitting a corporate actor to breach home-State laws in the territory of another State would 
also be viewed as such.23 While logical, the legal extrapolation of such a position in terms of 
corporate actors is not straightforward due to the failure of international law to accommodate 
corporate actors in the accountability processes, save in extremely limited exercises of 
diplomatic protection or in the aforementioned cases where the State serves as the surrogate 
for the corporate environmental harm perpetrator.  
Recently, a further advance was made when the Inter-American Court of Human Rights took 
a view on transboundary environmental harm that breached human rights obligations across 
borders. But again, in this instance the State was the perpetrator of the harm, rather than a 
corporate actor, and the individual harmed was deemed to be under the perpetrating State’s 
authority, responsibility or control for purposes of jurisdiction.24 The case is interesting as the 
extraterritorial application of the human rights treaty in question tracks an argument not 
dissimilar to that required to overcome the jurisdictional barriers to corporate accountability 
for human rights abuse in global supply chains. Namely, that the home-State obligations are 
binding outside its own territorial jurisdiction which requires a legal fiction to be created to 
overcome the jurisdictional impediment. In the Inter-American case, this was done by crafting 
a limited agency relationship between the perpetrating State and the victim despite the victim 
                                                          
21 ‘Foreign cubed’ refers to a foreign defendant committing a human rights violation against a foreign person in a 
foreign country, see SM Grant, D Zilka, ‘The Rise of Foreign Investors in Federal Securities Class Actions’ in 
Securities Litigation & Enforcement Institute 2004, 91, 96 (PLI Corp. Law & Practice, Course Handbook Ser. 
No. B-1442, 2004) as cited in M Steinitz, ‘The Case for an International Court of Civil Justice’ (2014) 67 
Stanford Law Review Online 75, 78, n 20. See discussion in McCall-Smith, Rühmkorf, ‘Reconciling Human 
Rights‘, 154-55.  
22 SD Murphy, ‘Does International Law Obligate States to Open Their National Courts to Persons for the 
Invocation of Treaty Norms That Protect or Benefit Persons?’ in D Sloss (ed), The Role of Domestic Courts in 
Treaty Enforcement (CUP 2009). 
23 Human Rights Committee, Communication No R.12/52, López Burgos v. Uruguay , UN Doc A/36/40 (1981) 
176. See J Cerone, ‘Regional Human Rights Law Beyond Regional Frontiers: The Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights and US Activities in Iraq’ (2005) 9 ASIL Insights 32. 
24 IACtHR, Advisory Opinion OC-23/17. 
Forthcoming in V Ulfbeck and A Horowitz (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains: 
Contract and Tort – Interplay and Overlap (Routledge, 2019) 
 
10 
 
otherwise having no tie to the perpetrating State. However, the focus on the State as the 
responsible perpetrator due to its act or omission maintains the heretofore existing legal 
hurdle in that corporations cannot directly be held accountable in the international system.   
Recognising the ‘continuous evolution in international law’ in the Barcelona Traction case, 
the ‘considerable influence on international relations’ was highlighted by the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) as a reason necessitating that States give greater consideration to the 
growing body ‘of rules governing the creation and operation of corporate entities’ – entities 
which hold their own rights and responsibilities as legal actors.25 The logic of Barcelona 
Traction resonates in the twenty-first century struggle with supply chain governance in light 
of the above difficulty in holding corporations accountable at the international level. Notably, 
the idea that the volume of rules governing corporations would increase is a starting point for 
this discussion. The nature of these rules in terms of operation is represented by two distinct 
areas of law: domestic legal regulations and international law. Simultaneously, there is an 
increasing cadre of treaties demanding that the State protect individuals against harm from 
third parties.26 In general, the various rules can be viewed as preventative. The key difficulty 
is that parallel rules responding to violations of the preventative standards in terms of access 
to justice at the international level have not increased in any meaningful way and remain 
limited at the domestic level. Until there is a marked shift at the international level, one way 
of addressing the inequality between rule and redress in the public international law field is 
contract law since individual claims against corporations operating in a foreign State have 
difficulty getting to trial.27 Whereas tort law focuses on the harmed individual(s), a breach of 
contract claim under these circumstances can have an impact for the breaching supplier in the 
chain. This can be the case if the buyer procures a remedy for a breach of its CSR policy, 
including termination of the contract. Whilst, at least in the UK, there is no case law related to 
a violation of a CSR policy by a supplier yet, this does not mean that the use of contract law 
as an instrument of imposing CSR duties on suppliers would be futile. First, the existence of a 
remedy for a breach of a contractual term that incorporates a CSR policy into the buyer-
                                                          
25 Barcelona Traction case (Belgium v. Spain), 1970 ICJ Reports 3, para 39. 
26 For example: International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,  999 UNTS 171, 16 December 1966; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 UNTS 3, 16 December 1966; Convention 
on the Elimination of all forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 UNTS 13, 18 December 1979; 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3, 20 November 1989. 
27 J Zerk, ‘Corporate Liability for Gross Human Rights Abuses: Towards a Fairer and More Effective System of 
Domestic Law Remedies.  A Report Prepared for the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’ 
(OHCHR 2012), 44, 94; P Zumbansen, ‘Defining the Space of Transnational Law: Legal Theory, Global 
Governance, and Legal Pluralism’ (2012) 21 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 305, 305; 
Traidcraft/CORE, ‘Above the Law?’ 8. 
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supplier contract alone means that there is redress available, even if buyer companies choose 
not to use it, though enforcement will be variable and contingent on the nature of the clause 
and the law of the jurisdiction. Second, the fact that a CSR policy is contractual might lead the 
buyers to use their right to terminate a contract in case it is breached, but it might also lead to 
them not renewing the contract. As previous studies have shown, individual criminal and tort 
actions against corporations for abuse by suppliers or subsidiaries further down the supply 
chain are notoriously difficult.28 The following section sets out a number of international laws 
and standards that are non-justiciable at the international level and then introduces key 
advances in ‘hardening’ these soft principles through contracts.  
2. Relevant Law 
Because existing international treaties are unable to directly regulate corporate actors due to 
their limited international legal personality, soft law regimes have developed as a means of 
guiding States and businesses in their interactions with one another and their activity that 
directly impacts human rights. These soft regimes integrate elements of hard international law 
through explicit incorporation or direct reference, which serves to reinforce the obligations 
previously taken up by States.29 Though soft law is often criticised as a weak form of 
governance or simply ‘not law’ due to its non-binding nature, it is undoubtedly the most 
prolific in terms of both form and governance in many areas of international law.30  Not only 
is it much easier to agree due to the lack of prescribed formalities, the ability to capitalise on a 
multi-stakeholder approach that includes issue-specific experts aids in ensuring that soft laws 
can provide a greater depth than that which is generally agreed by diplomats in a negotiating 
forum – an issue of key importance in the examination of global supply chains due to the fast-
paced nature of these operations.   
Varying forms of international law offer key opportunities to guide responsible global supply 
chain management and fill the gaps otherwise left by the international legal framework of 
human rights treaties. This chapter now considers the most-referenced international standards, 
identified in section II and why they seem to have the greatest pull in the corporate sector. 
                                                          
28 Zerk, ‘Corporate Liability’, Appendix 2. See discussion in A Chander, ‘Unshackling Foreign Corporations: 
Kiobel’s Unexpected Legacy’ (2013) 107 AJIL 829; Traidcraft/CORE, ‘Above the Law?’; Murphy has 
examined the issue of enforcing international obligations, including human rights, in domestic courts more 
generally, see Murphy, ‘Does International Law Obligate States’ 94 et seq. 
29 C Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning’ in C Rodríguez-
Garavito (ed), Business and Human Rights: Beyond the End of the Beginning (CUP 2017) 14. 
30 A Boyle, C Chinkin, The Making of International Law (OUP 2007) 212-13; J d’Aspremont, Formalism and 
the Sources of International Law (OUP 2011) 128-9. 
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The most widely referenced international documents are the UDHR, ILO standards and the 
UN Global Compact. However, as will be explained below, the UN Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ 
Framework (UNGPs) must also be considered as this is the fastest-growing point of reference 
across the overarching CSR regimes and in business practice (discussed below).31  
a) The UDHR 
Adopted 70 years ago, the UDHR is the genesis of all human rights treaties and though it is 
not a binding instrument, many of its norms are binding either through customary 
international law or have been codified in a treaty.  Most of the abuses suffered as a result of 
poor supply chain management are directly addressed in the UDHR, including: non-
discrimination, the prohibition against torture, the right to life, the prohibition against slavery, 
the right to effective remedy, freedom of opinion and expression, freedom of association, etc. 
That two-thirds of the TNCs examined in our survey sample (section II) refer to the UDHR is 
unsurprising as it is the most widely available human rights document in the world and the 
umbrella for the modern human rights system and is consistently referenced by all UN organs. 
The frequency with which the document is referred to in both international and national 
governance structures facilitates the ease with which corporations have professed their 
commitment to its principles.32 In line with traditional international law, it expressly refers to 
the UN Members States and their pledge to observe and promote the UDHR standards of 
achievement with no mention of corporate actors.  
b) ILO Conventions and Policies 
The ILO has facilitated the adoption of around 200 conventions and protocols addressing a 
wide range of labour issues, including those endemic to poor supply chain management, such 
as child labour, modern slavery, collective bargaining, equal pay, among many others. The 
ILO’s tripartite structure incorporates both employer and employee concerns and is dedicated 
to the improvement of workplace conditions; therefore, these standards are a natural point of 
reference for TNCs, as borne out by the frequency of reference indicated in section II. There 
is a great deal of overlap between ILO instruments and the UDHR in terms of rights 
                                                          
31 UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, UN Doc A/HRC/17/31 (21 March 2011) annex 
(UNGPs). See  Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Business and Human Rights’; A Sanders, ‘The Impact of the “Ruggie 
Framework” and the United Nations Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights on Transnational Human 
Rights Litigation’ in J Martin, K E Bravo, The Business and Human Rights Landscape: Moving Forward, 
Looking Back (CUP 2015). 
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addressed. None of the ILO conventions, however, place a duty on corporate actors to observe 
the standards set out therein and, in line with traditional international law, the onus lies on 
States to enforce convention standards. While the duty on States is clear, the number of States 
ratifying the individual conventions varies wildly, thus the TNC at the top of the supply chain 
and the suppliers toward the bottom will not necessarily be party to the same, if any, of the 
ILO conventions. Furthermore, many of the most technical forms of guidance by the ILO is 
issued in a non-binding form. For example, the ILO adopted the Tripartite Declaration of 
Principles Concerning Multinational Enterprises and Social Policy (ILO MNE Declaration), 
and it is incumbent on all ILO Member States to observe the principles set down therein. The 
2017 iteration of the Declaration, generally tracks the development of the business and human 
rights discourse at the international level. It is intended to address key issues in the context of 
global supply chains and the recent revision expressly incorporates the 2030 Sustainable 
Development Goals and the UNGPs. The document aims to encourage multinational 
enterprises to make positive contributions to economic and social progress through the 
realisation of decent work. Equally, the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and 
Rights at Work and its concomitant follow-up procedure commits its Member States to 
respect and promote core rights that are intrinsic to responsible supply chain management, 
including: freedom of association, the prohibition against forced and child labour, among 
many others.33 Furthermore, the ILO has examined the issue of global supply chains and 
adopted express conclusions on work in global supply chains.34 Due to the tripartite nature of 
the ILO and its substantive engagement with employers, it is not surprising that general 
references to its standards are frequently referenced by corporations in their supply chain 
management policies. 
c) UN Global Compact 
Our assessment of the supply chain policies confirms that the UN Global Compact is another 
key point of reference used by TNCs. It is the longest-running and largest voluntary corporate 
sustainability initiative providing a minimum level of social and environmental standards 
through its Ten Principles.35 The Ten Principles36 are drawn from the UDHR, the ILO 
Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, as well as environmental and 
                                                          
33 ILO, Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work, 18 June 1998, updated Annex 15 June 2010. 
34 ILO, Resolution Concerning Decent Work in Global Supply Chains, Conclusions. 
35 Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, Introduction <https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-
gc/mission/principles> accessed 21 August 2018. 
36 The ILO also expressly acknowledges the UN Global Compact as a partner in its work on global supply 
chains.  
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anti-corruption agreements.37 The Principles expressly track the four core labour rights set out 
in the ILO Declaration on Fundamental Principles and Rights at Work. The Compact aims to 
guide businesses at every stage of the value chain and its Guide to Corporate Sustainability 
further clarifies that a healthy business demands that businesses proactively manage their 
value chains to ensure the well-being of workers, the communities in which they operate and 
the planet.38 The sheer reach of the Global Compact network justifies the high level of 
reference in supply chain management policies.   
d) UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights 
No examination of contemporary reference points for CSR standards and supply chain 
management would be complete without introducing the UNGPs. While not the most often 
directly referenced standards in the supply chain management codes of conduct we examined, 
the frequent reference to ILO policies and the Global Compact indirectly incorporate the 
UNGPs. Both explicitly have aligned with the guidance set out in the UNGPs, providing a 
framework for how to action the UN Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework on Business 
and Human Rights. The 2011 endorsement of the UNGPs by the Human Rights Council was 
viewed as a ‘watershed’ moment in the heretofore fractious relationship between human 
rights and the business community.39 Government and business community support quickly 
coalesced to render the UNGPs the primary focus in business and human rights discourse and 
the foundation from which the future of the field would proceed.40 The UNGPs were 
incorporated almost verbatim into the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and are 
used as a point of reference for a growing number of international corporate social 
responsibility schemes.41  
e) Summary 
                                                          
37 For example, Rio Declaration on the Environment and Development, UN Doc A/RES/66/288 (2012); UN 
Convention against Corruption, 31 October 2003, 2349 UNTS 41. 
38 UN Global Compact, ‘Guide to Corporate Sustainability: Shaping a Sustainable Future’ December 2014, 7. 
39 Human Rights Council, Resolution 17/4 ‘Human Rights and TNCs and other Business Enterprises’ UN Doc 
A/HRC/RES/17/4 (16 June 2011). Economist Intelligence Unit, The Road from Principles to Practice: Today’s 
Challenges for Business in Respecting Human Rights (2015). 
40 See generally, Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Business and Human Rights’; Sanders, ‘The Impact of the “Ruggie 
Framework”. 
41 OECD, ‘OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises’ (OECD Publishing 2011).  For the UNGPs as a 
point of reference, see Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), ‘G4 Guidelines and ISO 26000:2010 How to use the 
GRI G4 Guidelines and ISO 26000 in conjunction’ (January 2014); European Commission, ‘Commission Staff 
Working Document on Implementing the UN Guiding Principles for Business and Human Rights’ SWD(2015) 
144, 14 July 2015. 
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The repeated reference to international standards supports the consolidation of consensus 
regarding the minimum standards of practice for businesses and human rights, which is at the 
heart of responsible supply chain management. In our sample, TNCs refer to a number of 
different international standards in their supplier codes of conduct. For example, Vodafone 
and AngloAmerican list, inter alia, the UDHR and ILO conventions as references for their 
Codes.42 This combination of different standards suggests that companies base their codes on 
the most widely recognised international standards for issues of CSR. Whilst the combination 
per se does not have any contractual effect, it is probably used by the buyer companies to 
demonstrate both to the public (particularly consumers) and to their suppliers that CSR is 
important. Also, some of the standards have a slightly different focus and coverage (e.g. by 
definition, the ILO focuses on labour standards, whereas the Global Compact also addresses 
bribery) and therefore the combination ensures that the TNC seems to cover key CSR issues. 
3. Overcoming the International Barriers 
In direct response to the growing international initiatives and the continuous stream of reports 
of business aggravating human rights, a number of States and even greater number of civil 
society voices have called for an international treaty addressing business and human rights.43 
This proposal has been met with criticism and, as currently framed, it is not difficult to see 
why as it does little more than add to an already substantial library of international treaties 
that are designed to protect human and labour rights.44 A stronger approach would be to 
address incorporation of existing human rights obligations at the domestic level. Preventative 
domestic law can take two forms, national regulation or private contract. While there are 
examples of national regulations addressing issues of supply chain governance, they rest 
predominantly on self-reporting and transparency requirements, which are often ineffective or 
the law is riddled with loopholes that permit maintenance of the status quo.45 Recent examples 
of national regulation focused on improving supply chain governance include: the US Dodd-
                                                          
42 See Vodafone Code of Ethical Purchasing, Version 2.0 and AngloAmerican, Responsible Sourcing Standard 
for Suppliers (November 2016). 
43 Human Rights Council, ‘Elaboration of an International Legally Binding Instrument on TNCs and Other 
Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights’ UN Doc A/HRC/26/L.22/Rev.1 (26 June 2014); see 
Rodríguez-Garavito, ‘Business and Human Rights’, 32 et seq; Humberto Cantu Rivera, ‘Negotiating a Treaty on 
Business and Human Rights: The Early Stages’ (2017) 40 UNSWLJ 1200; Joylon Ford and Claire Methven 
O’Brien, ‘Empty Rituals or Workable Models? Towards a Business and Human Rights Treaty’ (2017) 40 
UNSWLJ 1223. 
44 JG Ruggie, ‘A UN Business and Human Rights Treaty?’ An Issues Brief, Harvard University, 28 January 
2014. 
45 See for an assessment of the UK Modern Slavery Act, A Okoye, ‘Corporate Enterprise Principles and UK 
Regulation of Modern Slavery in Supply Chains’ (2017) 28 ICCLR 196. 
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Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act;46  the 2017 French Due Diligence 
Law;47 and the 2015 UK Modern Slavery Act.48 These regulatory acts each represent a step in 
the right direction, yet they fall short of promising comprehensive and effective supply chain 
management. In order to give tangible effect to the standards produced at the international 
level, responsible businesses are increasingly relying upon contracts to demand higher levels 
of socially sustainable performance from their suppliers.  
V. Contract law perspectives 
From a contract law perspective, the use of and reference to international CSR standards 
raises issues such as the mode of incorporation, the drafting of the contractual terms related to 
CSR and enforcement. These will be addressed insofar as they are relevant to the underlying 
question of using international standards in private supply contracts. 
1.  Incorporation of the international CSR standards into supply chains 
The review of the 30 companies’ codes of conduct will show in this section a range of 
different ways in which companies incorporate international CSR standards into their supply 
chains.49 
The first and seemingly most frequent method is using the international standards as a 
reference point for the supplier code of conduct that the TNC imposes on its suppliers. The 
supplier codes of conduct of the TNCs at the top of the chain stipulate CSR obligations for 
their suppliers on issues such as forced and child labour, based on the principles found in the 
international standards that they used as ‘reference point’. The stringency of the language in 
the codes themselves varies from more binding forms that require the contractual partners to 
meet these standards to more aspirational forms such as ‘strive to…’50 or ‘we have established 
the aspiration that the working conditions in our supply chain should meet standards based on 
international guidelines.’51 An example of this approach can be found in the supplier code of 
conduct of the company AngloAmerican which states: 
                                                          
46 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, s 1504, Disclosure of payments by resource 
extraction issuers. 
47 Loi n° 2017-399 du 27 mars 2017 relative au devoir de vigilance des sociétés mères et des entreprises 
donneuses d'ordre (1). 
48 UK Modern Slavery Act 2015, s 54(1). 
49 See for a general assessment of CSR in supply chain contracts in English law: A Rühmkorf, Corporate Social 
Responsibility, Private Law and Global Supply Chains (Edward Elgar 2015) chapter 3. 
50 See AngloAmerican, Responsible Sourcing Standards for Suppliers, 2. Safety and Health: ‘Suppliers therefore 
must: 2.1 Strive to eliminate fatalities, work-related injuries and health impairment of the workforce…’. 
51 See British Telecom, Generic Standard 18 Sourcing with human dignity, 1 Background. 
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External reference points: The following have been used as reference points and may 
be referred to by suppliers if additional detail is required: [then list of international 
standards follows].52 
A further example of the reference to international standards in the supply chain documents is 
the following statement from Burberry: 
We require all our supply chain partners, whether they are providing products or 
services, to agree with our Responsible Business Principles. These include the 
Burberry Ethical Trading Code of Conduct, Migrant Worker and Homeworker Policy. 
The Ethical Trading Code of Conduct is underpinned by the United Nations Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights, the Fundamental Conventions of the International 
Labour Organization and the Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code.53 
Unilever takes a similar line by saying that the principles in its Responsible Sourcing Policy 
(RSP) are ‘not a Unilever “creation”. They are anchored in internationally recognised 
standards.’54  
The second mode of incorporation is that the buyer companies require their suppliers to 
conduct their operation in a way that respects specific international CSR standards. For 
example, British American Tobacco states: 
As such, we expect our suppliers to conduct their operations in a way that respects the 
fundamental human rights of others, as affirmed by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.55 
The wording used here is vague in that ‘respect’ does not mean ‘comply with’, so it can be 
argued that it falls short of a binding legal requirement. However, given that the buyer expects 
the supplier to respect these documents, there is room for discussion about the actual legal 
effect of this wording. Still, it can be argued, that the buyer could request its suppliers to 
‘comply with’ a standard. So, at least, the examples here can be considered to be a business 
requirement. A question that we cannot assess by our documentary analysis is whether or not 
                                                          
52 AngloAmerican, Supplier Sustainable Development Code, 4. 
53 Burberry, Areas of Work: Labour and Human Rights, available at 
<https://www.burberryplc.com/en/responsibility/areas-of-work/labour-and-human-rights.html> accessed 23 May 
2018. 
54 Unilever, Unilever Responsible Sourcing Policy: Working in Partnership with our Suppliers, 6 
55 British American Tobacco, Supplier Code of Conduct, 5. 
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the buyer companies react differently in practice to the breach of a business and a legal 
requirement respectively.  
The third approach is similar to the second approach, but it uses more stringent language as, 
in this scenario, the company expressly requires their suppliers to comply with international 
standards. For example, AstraZeneca (Pharmaceuticals) declares: 
We expect our third parties to meet these strict standards, as set out in our Global 
Standard Expectations of Third Parties. Our Global Standard incorporates our Code of 
Conduct and key international standards, such as those published by the International 
Labour Organization (ILO).56 
This overview demonstrates that international companies at the top of the supply chain make 
use of international CSR instruments vis-a-vis their suppliers in different ways. Whilst some 
of them use these documents as a source that underpins the content of their supplier code of 
conduct, others require respect of the principles of such standards while then again others 
expressly require compliance with them. 
A related issue is the question under what circumstances CSR policies can become contractual 
terms. It would go beyond the scope of this chapter to address the issue in detail and this issue 
will therefore only be touched upon here briefly.57 Insofar as UK TNCs are concerned, the 
primary means of making CSR clauses contractual between buyers and suppliers is through 
the Terms and Conditions of Purchase of the buyer.58 Some companies include express CSR 
clauses directly in their terms and conditions, whereas others incorporate their supplier code 
of conduct into the terms and conditions by way of reference which then, in turn, often refers 
to the international law standards in the ways presented above.59  
An example of the first approach, i.e. to include express CSR clauses, is in the Terms and 
Conditions of Purchase from GlaxoSmithKline. Clause 21, entitled ‘Ethical Standards and 
Human Rights’, contains a list of CSR obligations which are imposed on their suppliers. For 
example, the clause stipulates that the supplier warrants that ‘it does not employ engage or 
                                                          
56 AstraZeneca, Global Standard Expectations of Third Parties. 
57 Note to the editors: Please refer here to other chapters of this book that contain a doctrinal analysis of contract 
law. 
58 Rühmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, 87. 
59 ibid. 
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otherwise use any child labour in any circumstances…’ and ‘that it does not use forced labour 
in any form…’.60 
An example of the latter approach can be found in the purchase order terms and conditions of 
Rio Tinto. Clause 10 stipulates that ‘the supplier will…(b) comply with Rio Tinto’s policy 
titled “The Way We Work”’.61 In this case, the code of conduct is not a term of the contract, 
but a reference document which will help to determine whether the contractual term that 
refers to it is a condition, warranty or innominate term.62 It is necessary to assess the 
provisions of the supplier code of conduct in order to determine whether or not the supplier 
has breached this contractual term. If the CSR clauses are effectively incorporated into the 
contract, then the supplier code of conduct can become enforceable on the supplier, depending 
on the wording of the CSR provisions.  
The following section will assess some examples of provisions in supplier codes of conduct in 
order to assess whether or not these constitute contractual terms that can be breached. 
Contract law has the power to give binding effect to otherwise soft and voluntary CSR 
instruments such as codes of conduct or international law soft instruments if it meets three 
criteria: First, such CSR clauses need to be effectively incorporated into the contract; second, 
the CSR provisions must be drafted in a binding way, so that alleged breaches by the supplier 
can be verified; and, third, the wording of the CSR provisions must be clear and 
unambiguous, as discussed in the next section. From a contract law point of view, these three 
issues are central; the status and purpose of the underlying standards in international law does 
not matter for their incorporation and enforcement in private contracts.  
2. Are the CSR provisions binding and enforceable? 
As noted, the issue whether or not the CSR clauses are binding and enforceable depends on 
the way they are drafted in the contracts between buyers and suppliers. Due to the focus on 
publicly available documents in our analysis, we can only assess Terms and Conditions of 
Purchase here and not individual contracts as these are not published. This section will 
therefore critically assess some examples of such CSR provisions. We will consider three 
scenarios here. The first one is the direct inclusion of CSR clauses into the terms and 
conditions by GlaxoSmithKline. They contain some clear, binding and verifiable CSR clauses 
                                                          
60 GlaxoSmithKline, GlaxoSmithKline Terms and Conditions of Purchase, clause 21. 
61 Rio Tinto London Limited, Purchase Order for the Supply of Goods, Terms and Conditions, clause 10 
(‘Compliance with law and policies’). 
62 See Rühmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, 87. 
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such as that the supplier ‘does not employ engage or otherwise use any child labour’ and that 
‘it does not use forced labour in any form’.63 The second scenario is that of incorporation of 
the supplier code of conduct by reference such as by Rio Tinto. However, although many 
companies seem to incorporate their supplier code of conduct into the contract by reference, it 
is important to consider that the wording of the supplier codes appears to differ significantly 
in terms of their stringency, so it is not possible to generalise. In the case of Rio Tinto, the 
section on ‘labour and human rights’ states the following: 
We support the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. We work 
with suppliers who uphold fundamental human rights including: Ensuring all work is 
freely chosen; without the use of forced and compulsory labour.64 
Whilst Rio Tinto’s statement indicates that it works with suppliers that do not use forced 
labour, it is a question of interpretation as to whether this provision requires suppliers to 
comply with this provision. This wording in Rio Tinto’s code does not amount to the level of 
bindingness that we find in the first scenario in GlaxoSmithKline’s terms and conditions 
which require the suppliers warrant that they do not employ forced labour.65 Similarly, there 
is a significant difference between ‘We support the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ 
and a wording that would state ‘we comply with…’. Therefore, it can be concluded that it 
might be difficult to prove a breach of the contractual CSR terms by Rio Tinto’s suppliers. 
This situation raises the question of whether or not these terms can be enforced in practice.  
However, another company, Unilever demonstrates that it is, in principle, possible to impose 
binding CSR obligations on suppliers through a supplier code of conduct that is incorporated 
into the contract by reference. Unilever’s terms and conditions of purchase stipulate that:  
Each supplier…acknowledges that it has reviewed Unilever’s Responsible Sourcing 
Policy (“RSP”) and agrees that all of their activities shall be conducted in accordance 
with the RSP.66 
Still, the question of whether or not the CSR obligation is binding depends on the wording of 
the provision in Unilever’s RSP. In case it is not firm and clear it may be that there is a 
mismatch between the stringent incorporation of the policy into the contract and the wording 
                                                          
63 GlaxoSmithKline, GlaxoSmithKline Terms and Conditions of Purchase, clause 21. 
64 Rio Tinto, The Way We Work, clause 1.3. 
65 Ibid. 
66 Unilever, General Terms & Conditions of Purchase of Goods of Unilever Supply Chain Company AG 
(“Conditions”), clause 13. 
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of the actual policy itself. In the case of Unilever, the sourcing policy contains mandatory 
requirements and continuous improvement benchmarks. One of the mandatory requirements 
is the following provision: 
Work is conducted on a voluntary basis: Forced labour, whether in the form of 
indentured labour, bonded labour or other forms, is not acceptable. Mental and 
physical coercion, slavery and human trafficking are prohibited.67 
This provision is binding on the supplier and a violation of this wording can be verified as the 
supplier ‘agrees that all of their activities shall be conducted in accordance with the RSP’. 
Therefore, Unilever is an example where the supplier code of conduct contains clear and 
binding obligations that it imposes on the supplier and which can be used to determine 
whether or not the supplier has breached a contractual term. 
Finally, the third scenario concerns that of compliance with an international CSR standard. An 
example of this approach can be found in the code of conduct of British American Tobacco 
(BAT) which states:  
…As such, we expect our suppliers to conduct their operations in a way that respects 
the fundamental human rights of others, as affirmed by the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.68 
Their terms and conditions of purchase are not available online, but BAT states on its website 
that its supplier code of conduct defines ‘the minimum standards we expect our suppliers to 
adhere to in order to supply goods or services to BAT and any BAT Group company.’69 
Therefore, it appears that suppliers have to adhere to the principles of the UDHR and that it is 
down to the wording of this document to determine whether or not a BAT supplier has 
violated the company’s supplier code of conduct. UDHR Article 4 reads: ‘No one shall be 
held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.’ 
This wording is clear, strict and a violation of it can thus be verified. It can thus be argued that 
suppliers are obliged to comply with this Article, given that BAT establishes an expectation to 
adhere to the principles of the UDHR. This is an important finding, as the Declaration thereby 
gains binding legal effect between the contractual parties of the supply agreement (i.e. the 
TNC as the buyer and its supplier) through contract law. BAT is therefore able to enforce this 
                                                          
67 Unilever, Responsible Sourcing Policy: Working in Partnership with Our Suppliers. 
68 British American Tobacco, Supplier Code of Conduct, 5. 
69 British American Tobacco, ‘Policies, Principles and Standards’ <http://www.bat.com/principles> accessed 23 
May 2018 
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principle by applying the usual instruments of contract law, which are primarily damages in 
the case of English law.70 Also, in those cases where the breach of a contractual term concerns 
a condition, the breach is considered to be repudiatory and the non-breaching party gains the 
right to terminate the contract.71  
 
3. Enforcement of the CSR provisions down the chain and by third parties 
The next issue is how these contractual CSR provisions can be enforced. Here, two scenarios 
must be distinguished. First, the enforcement down the chain onto suppliers and sub-
suppliers; secondly, the enforcement by the employees of the suppliers who are the intended 
beneficiaries of the contractual CSR terms in the contracts between buyers and suppliers. 
Enforcement is only possible if the Terms and Conditions of Purchase that contain the CSR 
provisions are indeed part of the contract. In English law, the rules on unfair commercial 
contract terms cannot make invalid CSR policies included in the contracts between buyers and 
their suppliers as these rules primarily focus on business-to-consumer relationships.72 The 
validity of such clauses is, however, discussed in other legal systems such as in German law.73 
In case the supplier is in breach of a contractual CSR term, the buyer can procure a remedy. 
However, here it must be noted that in English law (and in common law generally) the 
primary remedy against the party that is in breach of a contractual obligation is the right to 
demand damages.74 If the seller has breached a condition then the buyer can procure the right 
to repudiate the contract, i.e. terminate it.75 This situation differs from civil law jurisdiction 
where the usual remedy is to force the defaulting party to perform the contract.76 The remedy 
of specific performance is rarely awarded in English law.77 
The enforcement down the chain onto sub-suppliers is an important issue for the actual reach 
of the CSR commitments as global supply chains are often complex and long. Many TNCs at 
the top of the chain do not directly contract with all the suppliers in their chain. Rather, the 
                                                          
70 See N Andrews, Contract Law (2nd edn, CUP 2015) chapter 18. 
71 See Rühmkorf, Corporate Social Responsibility, 108. 
72 See the statutory framework: The Unfair Contract Terms Act 1977, The Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulation 1999, The Sale of Goods Act 1979, The Supply of Goods and Services Act 1982 and The Consumer 
Credit Act 1974. 
73 See B Spießhofer and F Graf von Westfalen, ‘AGB-Recht, CSR-Klausel, Corporate Social Responsibility, 
Inhaltskontrolle’ (2015) Betriebs-Berater 75. 
74 JM Smits, Contract Law: A Comparative Introduction (Edward Elgar 2014) 194. 
75 J Poole, Textbook on Contract Law (11th edn, OUP 2012) 57-9. 
76 Smits, Contract Law, 194. 
77 R Stone, The Modern Law of Contract (9th edn, Routledge 2011) para 15.9. 
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supply chain management often establishes a complex supply chain, consisting of different 
tiers of suppliers and sub-suppliers.  
However, contract law concerns, first and foremost, the parties of the contract. The privity of 
contract doctrine stipulates that it is a general rule that third parties cannot be subjected to a 
burden by a contract to which they are not a party.78 Therefore, the sub-suppliers that are not 
party of the contract between the TNC and their direct contractual partners are not bound by 
the supplier code of conduct. This means that they are beyond the direct reach of this contract. 
It is not possible for the corporation at the top of the chain to directly impose CSR obligations 
onto sub-suppliers. This situation significantly limits the practical effects and thus the power 
of contract law as an instrument of promoting CSR.79 
The second scenario concerns the issue of enforcement by third parties, in particular, the 
employees of the suppliers who could be seen as the intended beneficiaries of the contractual 
CSR clauses.80 The practical effect of these CSR clauses across the chain would be stronger if 
these third parties were to acquire a right to enforce them. Traditionally, in English law, third 
parties were unable to enforce a contract that they are not party of, even if that contract has 
been expressly entered into for their benefit due to the privity of contract doctrine.81 
The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 opens up the possibility for such third 
parties to derive a right of enforcement. The first avenue for such a right is that a term of the 
contract expressly provides that the third party may enforce a right in its own right.82 
However, none of the Terms and Conditions of Purchase of the companies analysed here 
contained such a provision. Alternatively, a third party who is not party to a contract may 
enforce a contractual term if the term purports to confer a benefit on him.83 The third party 
must be expressly identified in the contract by name, as a member of a class or as answering a 
particular description but need not be in existence when the contract is entered into.84 In 
Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Ayres, these conditions were interpreted as meaning that ‘on a 
true construction of the term in question its sense has the effect of conferring a benefit on the 
                                                          
78 Andrews, Contract Law, 175. 
79 It is often argued by civil society that due to their size and the numbers of their orders, TNCs have a strong 
bargaining power in practice which they could use to impact on working conditions further down their supply 
chain irrespective of the actual reach of their contracts with their direct suppliers. This issue is beyond the 
analysis of contract law here, however.   
80 For detailed discussion, see chapter xx in this volume. 
81 See Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre Co. Ltd v Selfridge & Co Ltd [1915] AX 847. 
82 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, s1 (1) (a). 
83 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, s1 (1) (b). 
84 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, s3. 
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third party in question.’85 It can be argued that, for example, the terms and condition of 
GlaxoSmithKline purport to confer a benefit on the supplier’s employees as a third party. An 
example of this are the clauses in their terms and conditions which state that the supplier 
warrants that ‘it does not use forced labour in any form’ and that it ‘complies with the laws on 
working hours…in the countries in which it operates.’ As these clauses clearly refer to the 
working conditions that the supplier provides, its employees can be identified as the 
beneficiaries. However, in practice, this interpretation does not seem to have much of an 
impact, as this provision does not apply if on a proper construction of the contract it appears 
that the parties did not intend the term to be enforceable by the third party.86 In fact, the 
assessment of the contractual documents from the 30 FTSE 100 companies shows that an 
exclusion clause in the terms and conditions seems to be common practice such as this one 
from GlaxoSmithKline:  
Except for any rights granted to GSK Affiliates, which the parties hereby designate as 
intended third party beneficiaries to the Agreement, no person who is not a party to the 
Agreement shall have any rights under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 
1999 to enforce any term.87 
This situation means that the third parties who are the beneficiaries of the CSR clauses in the 
supply contracts do not derive a right to enforce these such as the right to form and to join a 
trade union, which is also found in the core ILO conventions. In practice, this exclusion of 
third party rights significantly limits the impact contract law as a tool for the promotion of 
CSR in global supply chains. 
VI. Implications of the interaction of ‘the international’ with ‘the national’ in the 
context of CSR in global supply chains 
In this section, we will discuss the implications of this interaction of international soft law 
with national private contract law under four headings: first, the hybridisation of law in this 
system of CSR promotion; second, the role that TNC home-States play for the use of contract 
law through legislation as their as legislative requirements can impact on the way how TNCs 
choose to incorporate CSR issues into their supply chain contracts (i.e. in a more or less 
                                                          
85 Prudential Assurance Co Ltd v Ayres [2007] EWHC 775 (Ch); [2007] 3 All ER 946. 
86 Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, s2. See also: N Andrews, ‘Strangers to Justice No Longer: The 
Reversal of the Privity Rule under the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 and its Implications for 
Commercial Contracts’ (2000) LMCLQ 540, 545. 
87 GlaxoSmithKline, GlaxoSmithKline Terms and Conditions of Purchase, section 25 (‘General’). 
Forthcoming in V Ulfbeck and A Horowitz (eds), Corporate Social Responsibility in Supply Chains: 
Contract and Tort – Interplay and Overlap (Routledge, 2019) 
 
25 
 
stringent way); third, the implications for the respective roles of private law and for public 
international law; fourth, the significance of enforcement mechanisms. 
1. Hybridisation 
The interaction of public international law and national contract law creates a hybrid 
regulatory system.88 The reference to hybrid regulatory system means a system in which 
different forms of regulation interact, such as private law, public law, soft and hard law 
standards developed by international organisations and private regulation by and between 
companies. Heldeweg notes that the characteristic feature of such a system is ‘a mix of 
origins.’89 This hybridisation of CSR regulation is particularly based on the fact that contracts 
between private parties can give binding legal effect to CSR standards that are otherwise not 
binding on the parties. In this regulatory framework, we can observe that various regulatory 
models such as direct regulation by government, regulation by contract and outsourcing of 
regulatory functions to third parties, coexist. This bears witness of a move from soft to hard 
law regulation of CSR without direct imposition by the State.  
Within this system, the way CSR is incorporated into supply contracts and the way such 
contractual terms are monitored and enforced depends on the private parties. This shows that 
the hybrid system not only needs external steering through home-State legislation, but also 
effective enforcement mechanisms to hold TNCs accountable for the way they purport to 
promote CSR across their supply chains. Legislation by the home-States of TNCs steers how 
these companies make use of their contractual power to harden international CSR standards.90 
This system can thus create an accountability framework for the global supply chains. 
Whether or not contractual CSR clauses between buyers and suppliers are actually enforced, 
is an issue that is addressed below. In any case, this hybrid system can contribute towards 
filling the regulatory gaps for CSR in global supply chains.91 
2. The role of the home-States of TNCs 
                                                          
88 See for a discussion of the term ‘hybrid’ in relation to regulation: M Vrielink, C van Montfort, M Bokhorst, 
‘Codes as Hybrid Regulation’ in D Levi-Faur (ed), Handbook on The Politics Of Regulation (Edward Elgar 
2011) para 35.5.2. See also: A Kun, ‘From transnational soft law to national hard law? – regulating supply 
chains’ (2015) 8 Pecsi Munkajogi Kozlemenyek 53. 
89 MA Heldeweg, ‘Hybrid Regulation as a Legal Design Challenge‘ in N Lemay-Hébert and R Freedman (eds) 
Hybridity: Law, Culture and Development (Routledge 2017) 105. 
90 See G LeBaron, A Rühmkorf, ‘Steering CSR through Home State Regulation: A Comparison of the Impact of 
the UK Bribery Act and Modern Slavery Act on Global Supply Chain Governance’ (2017) 8 (S3) Global Policy 
15. 
91 See M P Vandenberg, ‘The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global Governance’ 
(2007) 54 UCLA L Rev 913, 919. 
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The second important implication of this interaction of international soft law and national 
contract law is that the home-States of TNCs assume a significant role in the hybrid 
regulatory system. They are important for the effectiveness of the hybrid system of promoting 
CSR as their laws have the capacity to steer the way Western TNCs use their contractual 
power in supply chain contracts by ‘inducing’ them to promote CSR in their private 
contracts.92  
By establishing a statutory requirement to deal with CSR home-State legislation can help to 
overcome the ‘fragmented approach’ towards a level-playing field where the TNCs have to 
promote CSR in a more uniform way. In recent years, home-States of TNCs have increasingly 
passed laws that impact CSR issues in global supply chains.93 The majority of such laws are 
transparency laws, but we see a continuum of different types of laws that affect different 
issues (e.g. modern slavery, bribery) and have different levels of stringency (ranging from soft 
disclosure laws to stringent corporate criminal liability).94 
In most cases, the home-States are ‘regulating self-regulation.’95 For example, the UK 
Modern Slavery Act leaves it to companies how they deal with modern slavery and 
trafficking. But there are examples of more stringent forms of regulation such as the UK 
Bribery Act 2010 and the 2017 French devoir de vigilance law where due diligence 
requirements are imposed on companies (although indirectly in the case of the UK Bribery 
Act, but still in a stringent form as a defence to a corporate offence). Thus far, there is little 
research on the question how different forms of home-State legislation impact private 
governance relations between buyers and suppliers. A recent small-scale study, co-authored 
by one of the two authors of this chapter, compared the way 25 FTSE 100 companies deal 
with bribery and modern slavery in their corporate documents respectively indicates that 
                                                          
92 See for a discussion of extraterritorial legislation: A de Jonge, TNCs and International Law: Accountability in 
the Global Business Environment (Edward Elgar 2011) 91-126. 
93 A recent study found that national governments have passed 19 pieces of national legislation in the last few 
years which are aimed at combatting the business of forced labour in global supply chains. See N Phillips, G 
LeBaron, S Wallin, ‘Mapping and Measuring the Effectiveness of Labour-Related Disclosure Requirements for 
Global Supply Chains’ (ILO, Geneva, 2016). 
94 See A Rühmkorf, ‘From Transparency to Due Diligence Laws? Variations in Stringency of CSR Regulation in 
Global Supply Chains in the ‘Home State’ Of Multinational Enterprises’ in J du Plessis, U Varottil, J Veldman 
(eds), Globalisation of Corporate Social Responsibility and its Impact on Corporate Governance (Springer 
2018) 177. 
95 One perspective on this phenomenon is that of meta-regulation. Parker understands meta-regulation as the 
state regulating its own regulation as well as any form of regulation that regulates any other form of regulation, 
for example legal regulation of self-regulation, non-legal methods of ‘regulating’ internal corporate self-
regulation or management and the regulation of national law-making by transnational bodies, see C Parker, 
‘Meta-regulation: Legal accountability for corporate social responsibility’ in D McBarnet, A Voiculescu and T 
Campbell (eds), The new corporate accountability: Corporate social responsibility and the law (CUP 2007) 210. 
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stronger home-State laws on bribery seem to result in stricter corporate policies on bribery 
than on modern slavery.96 This, in turn, raises the question how those policies translate into 
business practices. More research is therefore needed to analyse the interaction of public and 
private governance and, in particular, to analyse what kind of public governance leads to more 
effective forms of private CSR promotion. 
3. Implications for the respective roles of private law and for public international 
law 
The increasing frequency with which businesses are incorporating or referencing global 
human rights standards or social sustainability principles in their supply chain contracts 
indicates progress towards truly sustainable business from both a social and environmental 
perspective although the question remains to what extent companies walk their talk, i.e. do the 
TNCs that incorporate CSR standards into the contracts with their suppliers also ensure that 
these principles are followed throughout their supply chain or do they rather use these 
standards for PR reasons. The trend recognises the growing understanding of the role played 
by business in respecting the rights of individuals and preventing human and labour rights 
abuse in concert with the State’s duty to do so.97 However, for the same reason that the 
implementation of human rights treaties has been ineffective, international standards as a 
reference point alone will be ineffective unless backed up by strong methods of redress. 
Contract law provides at least some potential measure of consequence for a supplier failing to 
uphold the referenced standards. 
It is, however, an imperfect response for a number of reasons. Firstly, private law, contract or 
otherwise, was not designed to assume a public, regulatory function and may be ill-equipped 
to do so, particularly when the alleged conduct is legal in one State and not in another. For 
example, the minimum child labour age or working hours standards differ greatly among 
States. Secondly, a contract claim will only yield a result for the corporate claimant. 
Individuals remain victims without redress and the loss of the supply contract could have far-
reaching repercussions for individuals suddenly faced with no employment as opposed to 
employment in substandard conditions. Finally, contract dispute decisions are not designed to 
be determined based on the perceived breach of a social standard which is not perfectly 
defined. Where contracts generally demand precision, human rights standards are framed in 
imprecise terms by necessity. Thus, while contracts present one of the best options from the 
                                                          
96 G LeBaron, A Rühmkorf, ‘Steering CSR through Home State Regulation’. 
97 See the ‘protect, respect, remedy’ framework in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights. 
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point of holding businesses to account for poor business practices, the value to the rights 
holder remains enigmatic.  
Equally, this hybrid system has implications for the role of private law. In this hybrid system, 
private parties act as the regulators that use private law, including contract law, as the 
instrument of regulation. Thus, private law assumes a regulatory function.98 The way in which 
private law promotes CSR raises the question of whether the traditional understanding of 
private law as primarily regulating the legal relationships between private individuals, without 
pursuing any goals for the benefit of wider society, is still tenable. By providing mechanisms 
in contract law for the incorporation and enforcement of CSR commitments by private actors, 
private law indirectly also promotes the general public interest. The incorporation of CSR 
policies that we have analysed create a system of contract governance.99 In the promotion of 
CSR, private law does not purely facilitate the use of individual rights between private parties, 
but it also de facto pursues public policy goals. This is a phenomenon that Smits refers to as 
‘private law 2.0.’100 The advantage of contract law here is its ability to overcome territorial 
boundaries as, in the supply chain contracts that are concluded between companies from 
different countries, its effects are not restricted to the territory of one country. It thus helps to 
close the governance gap of global supply chains. It is law that goes ‘beyond the State’101 
which contributes to the creation of a ‘private legal world order.’102  
Thus, here we witness a changing role for private law, away from the pure facilitation of 
private relationships, to a more international and more public role with diverse uses of private 
law by private actors.103 It can be argued that this changing role of private law has been 
pushed further by the UNGPs as they have led to a process where national governments are 
starting to contemplate how they can implement the recommendations of the Principles 
through national legislation and publishing National Action Plans.104 Some of the recent 
                                                          
98 See H Collins, Regulating Contracts (OUP 1999) 56-93. See also K Peterkova Mitkidis, ‘Using Private 
Contracts for Climate Change Mitigation’ (2014) 2 Groningen Journal of International Law 65-76. 
99 See generally: S Grundmann, F Möslein, K Riesenhuber (eds) Contract Governance: Dimensions in Law and 
Interdisciplinary Research (OUP 2015). 
100 J M Smits, ‘Private Law 2.0: On the Role of Private Actors in a Post-National Society’ (Hague Institute for 
the Internationalisation of Law and Eleven International Publishing, 2011). 
101 N Jansen & R Michaels (eds), Beyond the State: Rethinking Private Law (Mohr Siebeck 2008). 
102 S B Spießhofer, Unternehmerische Verantwortung: Zur Entstehung einer globalen Weltordnung (Nomos 
2017) 593-596. 
103 See for a discussion of ‘regulatory contract law’: R Brownsword, R A.J. van Gestel, H-W. Micklitz, 
‘Introduction – contract and regulation: changing paradigms’ in R Brownsword, R A.J. van Gestel, H-W. 
Micklitz, Contract and Regulation: A Handbook on New Methods of Law Making in Private Law (Edward Elgar 
2017). 
104 See, for example, HM Government, ‘Good Business: Implementing the UN Guiding Principles on Business 
and Human Rights’ (Updated May 2016, Cm 9255). 
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home-State laws on CSR in global supply chains such as nonfinancial information disclosure 
laws are, therefore, at least indirectly, a consequence of this process. This means that although 
the UNGPs contain only recommendations, they are a key element of the interaction between 
international standards and national law considered here. Therefore, this international 
standard has directly impacted the way private law is used to pursue the recommendations set 
out therein. 
4. Enforcement is central for the effectiveness of this international – national regime 
Ultimately, the effectiveness of this hybrid system depends, to a large extent, on the issue of 
whether or not CSR obligations are enforced or, at least, potentially can be enforced. Whilst 
we have argued that a binding wording allows to verify breaches of contractual CSR 
obligations and thus gives the transnational corporation at the top of the chain a remedy for 
breach of contract, the situation for third parties is unsatisfactory. We argued that they could 
gain a right to enforce the contract which would make CSR clauses a much stronger tool in 
practice, but found that their rights are commonly excluded by contract. It is argued that this 
exclusion should no longer be possible. The present situation can ultimately result in a 
mockery of the contractual CSR clauses as such clauses can be used by TNCs as a pure public 
relations instrument with no danger of them being enforced by, for example, the employees of 
the suppliers. 105 The Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 makes it expressly possible 
for a third party to enforce a contractual term if the term purports to confer a benefit on him. 
If the parties do not want a third party to gain a right to enforce a contract, then they should 
choose not to include such a term. Otherwise, TNCs gain reputational benefits through their 
CSR policies whilst they do not risk any legal enforcement.106 
 
VII. Conclusions 
This chapter demonstrates that through contract law international law and national law 
interact in the promotion of CSR in global supply chains. Contract law is the tool that gives 
otherwise non-binding international CSR standards binding legal effect. Whether or not the 
TNCs as the buyers in global supply chains decide to enforce the contractual CSR clauses is 
their choice. Our analysis of 30 FTSE 100 companies reveals that the most widely used 
international standards are the UDHR and the ILO core conventions, followed by the UN 
                                                          
105 See or a detailed discussion of third-party rights: A Beckers, Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility 
Codes 147-148. Further, see chapter xx in this volume. 
106 See chapter xx in this volume, p. Xx. 
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Global Compact. There are also some, but fewer, references to the Ethical Trading Initiative 
Base Code, the UNGPs and the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises. 
We find that private law is used to fill the gaps left by natural parameters of public 
international law in the area of CSR. The adjudicatory mechanisms of international law 
continue to focus on States and, in the realm of human rights, are open to individuals in 
claims against States. As it is at present not possible to access justice against a transnational 
corporation directly at the international level, other legal approaches, including tort and 
contract law, are necessary for the development of an accountability framework. The question 
of whether or not such contractual CSR terms are, in fact, enforceable depends on two key 
issues: first, the incorporation of the CSR clauses into the contract; second, the way they have 
been drafted (i.e. are these clauses binding, precisely worded and not just aspirational?). This 
chapter suggests that the contractual reach of the CSR clauses and their enforcement is limited 
in practice as the CSR clauses are only directly effective between TNCs and their direct 
suppliers. They cannot impose a contractual obligation onto third parties outside the contract 
due to the privity of contract doctrine. Sub-contracting therefore constitutes a significant 
challenge for the promotion of CSR through contract. Also, the right of enforcement is, in 
practice, limited to the parties of the contract – the transnational corporation and their direct 
suppliers. Third parties such as the employees of the supplier who are supposed to benefit 
from  the contractual CSR clauses can gain a right of enforcement in English law in 
accordance with the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999, but our research 
demonstrates that this right is usually excluded in the supply contracts.  
 
Despite these limitations, the use of international law in the supply chain, governed by 
national contract law, is a significant phenomenon: first, it leads to a hybrid system of 
promoting CSR where different regulatory techniques and forms of regulation interact – 
national and international law, hard and soft law, public and private law, public regulation 
with private regulation. The various interactions within this hybrid system are ripe for further 
research. Second, home-State legislation is central for the effectiveness of this hybrid system 
of promoting CSR in global supply chains; Third, the interaction of public international law 
and contract law that we have discussed here is part of a broader trend that sees the roles of 
these areas changing. Finally, this chapter has demonstrated that contract law is one potential 
option for developing the common understanding of CSR and an alternative route to access 
justice  for rights breaches when it is otherwise denied. 
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